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282 BRANDENBURG tJ. PAC. GAS & ELEc. Co. [28 C.2d·. 
[Sac. No. 6777. In Bank. May 81, 1946.] 
LlLI.AN BR.ANDENBURG, as Administratrix, etc., Appel-
lant, v. PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY 
(a Corporation) et a1.. Respondents. 
(1) Judgments - Judgment Non Obstante Veredicto. - A motion 
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict of a jury may prop-
erly be granted only if it appears from the evidence, viewed 
in the light most favorable to the party securing the verdict, 
that there is no substantial evidence to support the verdict. 
(2] Street Railways - Injuries From Operation - Degree of Care 
Required.-The standard of care required from a streetcar 
company and its employees with regard to the dangers from 
a turning car is not absolute but depends on the surrounding 
oircumstances. Their conduct must be viewed as a whole 
in the light of all circumstances from which negligence might 
be inferred, and the standard of oare to be exercised must be 
commensurate to the dangers of the business and the hazards 
at the place of the injury. 
[3) Negligence-Exercise of Care-Knowledge of Danger. - A de-
oisive oonsideration in determining whether an aot was neg-
ligent is whether the surrounding circumstances made it rea-
sonably foreseeable that there was a risk of injury. When this 
question depends on the foresight of another it becomes per-
tinent whether the other had reason to perceive danger, and 
whether alertness to the requirements of tht> situation could 
be expected of him. 
(4) Street Railways - Rounding Curves - Injuries from Over-
hang.-Where it should havt> been apparent to a streetcar 
company and its employees that persons alighting from its 
car in a safety zone would relax their vigilance and could 
reasonably be expected to divert their minds from the dangerS-" ... 
of the str~et traffic, they should have been warned that the 
car, whioh had stopped near a curve of the track, was going 
to turn and that its rear end would protrude into the safety 
zone, even though such zone was maintained by the city and 
not by the oarrier. It was not only the duty of the motorman 
to give such warning when hE' stnrt.ed the car after the stop, 
[1] See 14 Cal.Jur. 980; 30 Am.Jur. 844. 
[3] See 19 Cal.Jur. 583; 38 Am.Jur. 665. 
Mclt. Dig. References: [1] Judgmcllt.<. § 113(1); [2] Street 
Railways. § 49; [3] Negligence, § 25; [4] Street Railways, § 61 ; 
[6] Street Railways, § 78. 
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but also the duty of the company to instruct the motorman 
to give such warning. 
[5] Id. - Contributory Negligence-Near Tracks.-A person who 
was struck by the rear end of a turning streetcar after he had 
alighted therefrom in a safety zone was not contributively 
negligent where he had DO reason to believe that the zone 
would be within the area of the overswin/!:. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of 
Sacramento County. Peter J. Shields, Judge. Reversed 
with directions. 
Action for damages for personal injuries sustained when 
struck by a streetcal'. Judgment for defendant, notwith-
standing verdict for plaintiff, reversed with directions. 
Brandenburger & White and W. A. White for Appellant. 
Thos. J. Straub, F. H. Pearson and Jay L. Henry for 
Respondents. 
Huntington P. Bledsoe and Donahue, Richards & Ham-
lin as Amici Curiae on behalf of Respondents. 
TRAYNOR, J.-On June 11, 1943, plaintiff, his wife, and 
three small children boarded a streetcar of defendant corpora-
tion travelling north on 28th Street in Sacramento. The car 
was operated by one man, defendant Colwell. When the car 
approached P Street, plaintiff signalled the motorman to stop. 
At the corner of 28th and P Streets, adjacent to the track 
on 28th Street, there was a safety zone approximately 4 feet 
wide and 44 feet long outlined on the pavement by broad white 
stripes and marked at the corners with white buttons. Plain-
tiff and his family alighted from the front door of the car to 
the safety zone. After the stop, the car turned to the west 
around a curve to P Street. .As the car turned, the rear end 
overlapped the safety zone about two feet. The motorman 
was aware of the overlap but did not warn plaintiff that the 
car was going to turn west on P Street or call plaintiff's 
attention to the danger from the overlap. Plaintiff knew that 
there were curved tracks at that corner and that the car 
might therefore turn, but he did not "know definitely that it 
would turn." He testified that had he known the car was going 
to turn west on P Street, he would have remained on the car 
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until it reached 27th Street, because he would then have been 
one block nearer his destination. While standing in the safety 
zone, plaintiff was struck by the rear end of the car and 
seriously injured. He testified that he was struck three or 
four seconds after he alighted. He described the incident as 
follows: "Well, I stepped into the safety zone and while doing 
this I was observing the welfare of my family. 1 was looking 
after them. . • • I was motioning to them to stay in the clear 
and not to run out in the street, stay in the safety zone, and 
as I was turning to the left the back right side of the streetcar 
struck me or collided me striking me to the sidewalk." The 
jury returned a verdict for damages in the sum of $2,500. 
The trial court gave judgment for defendants notwithstanding 
the verdict. Plaintiff appealed. He died during the pendency 
of the appeal, and the administratrix of his estate was sub· 
stituted as plaintiff. In this opinion. however. thf' decedent 
will be referred to as plaintiff. 
[1] A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict of 
a jury may properly be granted only if it appears from the 
evidence. viewed in the light most favorable to the party 
securing the verdict, that there is no substantial evidence to 
support the verdict. If there is any substantial evidence, or 
reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, in support of 
the verdict, the motion should be denied. (Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 629: Neel v. Jlannings, Inc., 19 Ca1.2d 647. 649 [122 P.2d 
576]; Oard v. Bome, 210 Cal. 200 [291 P. 190]; :McKellar v. 
Pendergast, 68 Ca1.App.2d 485, 487 [156 P.2d 950).) There 
was ample evidence in the present case to support the verdict. 
It is contended that plaintiff had a right to feel secure 
from any collision with a streetcar whi1e he was standing in 
the safety zone and that he was at least entitled to a warning 
that the car would protrude into the safety zone. Defendants 
__ take _the position that since the traffic department of the city 
of Sacramento estal)lished the safety zone it was the city's 
responsibility if the zone was not so located that its users 
would be reasonably safe within the zone. They contend that 
streetcars are not required to keep clear of a safety zone, since 
section 572 of the Vehicle Code forbids the driving only of 
"vehicles," a term that does not include streetcars (§ 31). 
through or within a safety zone. Relying on Dwyer v. Los 
Angeles Ry. Oorp., 115 Cal.App. 709, 714 [2 P.2d 468], thily 
contend that the fact that in rounding a curve the rear end 
of a streetcar will swing beyond the track is so well known 
to every adult person that the motorman of a streetcar is 
) 
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under no legal duty to warn such a person of the possible 
danger of a collision from the swing of the car. 
The streetcar tracks in question were laid before the safety 
zone was established by the city. It does not appear therefore 
that defendant corporation was responsible for the failure of 
the ~afety zone to afford protection to its users against the 
dangers of streetcar traffic. ~or does the present case turn on 
the question whether the motorman of a streetcar that is about 
to turn on a curve is generally under a duty to warn an adult 
person within the area covered by the swing of the car. The 
controlling question is whether such a warning is required 
when the person who might be struck by the rear end of t.he 
car stands in a safety zone. 
[2J The standard of care required from a streetcar com-
pany and its employees with regard to the dangers from a 
turning car is not absolute but depends upon the surrollnding 
circumstances. Their conduct must be viewed as a whole in 
the light of all circumstances from which negligence might be 
inferred. especially "where the several elements from which 
negligence might be inferred are so closely interwovan as to 
form a single pattern, and where each imparts character to the 
others." (Blair v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 323 U.S. 600. 
604 [64 S.Ot. 545, 89 L.Ed. 490].) If their conduct is so 
judged a precaution necessary under some circum..c;tances may 
be unnecessary under others. In any event the standard of 
care to be exercised must be commensurate to the dangers of 
thE' business and the .hazard.c; at the place of the injury. (Peri 
v. Los Angeles ·'unction By. Co., 22 Oa1.2d 111, 123 [137 
P.2d 441], and cases there cited; Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line 
R. Co., 323 U.S. 574, 579 [65 S.Ot. 421, 89 L.Ed. 465]: Blair 
v. Baltim01'e & Ohio R. Co., supra, at 605.) [3J A decisive 
consideration in determining whether an act was negligent is 
whet.her the surrounding circumstances made it reasonably 
forseen hIe that there was a risk of injury. When this question 
depends on the foresight of another it becomeR pertinent 
whether the other had reason to perceive danger, and whether 
fl ]crtness to the requirement~ of the situation could be ex-
pected of him. Thus an actor's duties vary according to 
whether he fa(,es a child or an adnlt. a blind man or one who 
('an see. one who sleeps or one who is awake. His duties also 
vary according to whether he may reasonably expect another 
to be a,vare of danger or must know that another's sense of 
security has been relaxed. (See, Rest., Torts, §§ 290, 302; 
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Prosser, Torts, 243.) [4] In the present case it ~ould have 
been apparent to defendants that users of the safety zone 
would relax their vigilance. A safety zone is ordinarily an 
assurance to those within its limits that they are reasonably 
safe from danger. Even though defendants had no part in 
establishing the safety zone in an unsafe place, it should have 
been apparent to them that the users of the safety zone would 
act differently from ordinary users of the street. Regardless 
of whether one who stood in plaintiff's place had there been 
no safety zone would be entitled to a warning (see Dwyer 
v. Los Angeles Ry. Corp., 115 Cal.App. 709, 714 [2 P.2d 468] ; 
Wood v. Los Angeles Ry. Co., 172 Cal. 15 [155 P. 68]; Za-
lewski v. Milwaukee etc. Co., 219 Wis. 541, 545 [263 N;W. 
577]; Trail v. Tulsa Street Ry. Co., 97 Okla. 19 [222 P. 950]; 
see, also, Ann.Cas. 1916E 680) plaintiff, who stood in such a 
zone could reasonably be expected to divert his mind from 
the dangers of the street traffic, and should therefore have been 
warned that he was in danger of harm from the overswing of 
the car. "Conceding that a pedestrian must be presumed to 
take notice of the obvious fact that the body of a streetcar in 
rounding a curve must necessarily swing out some little dis-
tance from the track on the outside of the curve, plaintiff 
herein had no reason to believe that the markings of the 
safety zone would be within the area of the overswing." He 
had, therefore, the "right to rely upon the appearances." 
(Mangan v. Des Moines City Ry. Co., 200 Iowa 597 [203 N.W. 
705, 41 A.L.R. 368J; see, also, Laurent v. United Railways 
(Mo.), 191 S.W. 992; Elder v. Rutledge, 217 Ind. 459, 469, 
470 [27 N.E.2d 358]; Heva v. City of Seattle, 150 Wash. 
61 [272 P. 41J; Wilson v. In.ternational Ry. Co., 205 App.Div. 
275 [199 N.Y.S. 562]; Wechsler v. Pittsburgh Rys. Co., 247 
Pa. 96, 98 [93 A. 19] ;1 contra: Ferguson v. Kansas City Public 
Service Co., 159 Kan. 520 [156 P.2d 869, 875]; cf. Hering v. 
City of Detroit, 244 Mich. 293, 295 [221 N.W. 278] [zone 
unmarked but provided by city ordinance to exist at every 
regular stopping place of streetcars].) It makes no difference 
that in the Mangan case the defendant company had installed 
the safety zone, for the appearances on which plaintiff could 
rely were the same in both cases. Nor can it be said that 
because the Vehicle Code prohibits only the driving of vehicles, 
not including streetcars, through safety zones, the users of 
such zones are not justified in assuming that the zone affords 
protection from the dangers of streetcar traffic as well as 
) 
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from the dangers of other traffic. It is generally understood 
that it is the purpose of a safety zone to afford its users pro-
tection from all traffic hazards. In harmony with this common 
conception, section 88 of the Vehicle Code defines a safety 
zone as an "area or space lawfully set apart within a roadway 
for the exclusive use of pedestrians." The Vehicle Code dire('tl' 
its prohibition against passing through safety zones to ve-
hicles only because it presupposes that safety zones will be 
so arranged as to be out of the rell('h of Rtreetcars operated 
on stationary tracks 
Since plaintiff's right to a warning follows from his use of 
a safety zone and is a right enjoyed by any member of the 
public similarly situated, it is unnecessary to determine 
whether plaintiff, while standing in the safety zone, was still 
a passenger within the meaning of section 2100 of the Civil 
Code. (See Lagoma1'sino v. Market St. By. 00., 69 Cal.App.2d 
388,393 [158 P.2d 982]; Ohoquette v. Key System Transit 00., 
118 Cal.App. 643, 652 [5 P.2d 921].) Since the risk that 
materialized in this case was a general one and was neces-
sarily connected with the location of the safety zone and 
the curve of the tracks at that corner, it was not only the 
duty of the defendant motorman to warn plaintiff when he 
started the car but also the duty of the defendant corporation 
to instruct its motorman to give such a warning. The former 
is therefore liable not only for the negligence of its em-
ployees but also for its own negligence. 
[5J That plaintiff was not contributively negligent follows 
from our conclusion that he had no reason to believe that the 
safety zone would be within the area of the overswing. "Con-
tributory negligence is not imputable to a plaintiff for fail-
ing to look out for· a dangerwhich be __ 1!lld __ no :reasonable 
cause to apprehend,1 or to a plaintiff who was deceived by 
appearances calculated to deceive an ordinarily prudent per-
son." (Welsh v. Mercy Hospital, 65 Cal.App.2d 473, 479 [151 
P.2d 17]; see 38 Am.Jur. 866.) 
The judgment notwithstanding the verdict is reversed and 
the court is directed to enter judgment in accordance with 
the verdict of the jury. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer, 
J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
